Discovery of Reinsurance Information Rolls On

Policyholders and claimants seeking to access reinsurance contracts and other reinsurance information and communications to support their claims continues to take up plenty of judicial time. Courts are split on the issues, but the issues are all fact-dependent. In this post, I discuss two cases from this year where both courts granted motions seeking to disclose reinsurance information.

In Divinity v. Bridgefield Casualty Insurance Co., 3:24-cv-00522-LGI (S.D. Miss. Apr. 28, 2025), a pro se plaintiff, among other things, requested production of its insurer’s reinsurance agreement. The insurer moved to limit the disclosure of the reinsurance agreement. The insured sought the reinsurance agreement as relevant to the claim for bad faith coverage denial. The dispute centered on the initial disclosure requirement in Federal Rule of Procedure 26(a)(1)(A)(iv), which requires disclosure of

any insurance agreement under which an insurance business may be liable to satisfy all or part of a possible judgment in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment.

In denying the insurer’s motion to limit disclosure, the court held that “[the insurer] is self-insured and could satisfy the full amount of damages sought by Plaintiff is not a sufficient reason to excuse disclosure of [ the insurer’s] reinsurance agreement.” The court cited other cases where courts have held reinsurance agreements fit within the scope of 26(a)(1)(A)(iv) and found that it would not be burdensome for the insurer to produce the reinsurance agreement.

In Sinclair, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., No. 1:24-cv-03003-SAG (D. Md. Apr. 28, 2025), a coverage dispute arose over a cyber loss when the insurers denied coverage. A magistrate judge was asked to address a number of discovery disputes, including the policyholder’s request for production of reinsurance agreements and communications concerning reinsurance for cyber claims. The policyholder argued that the reinsurance information was relevant to its claim for bad faith.

While noting the diversity of decisions among the courts, the magistrate judge ultimately ruled that “that the reinsurance policies, as well as related documents and communications, are relevant to [the policyholder’s] bad faith claim and should be produced.” But because of the broadness of the document request, the court limited what information needed to be produced:

The Court will therefore limit Request No. 20 to all documents and communications shared between [the insurer] and [its] reinsurer(s)retrocessionaire(s), or their representatives, concerning the cyber claim, the [insurer’s] policy, or any reinsurance policy providing coverage to [the insurer] for [the policyholder’s] cyber claim.

What we glean from these cases is that courts seem to think reinsurance agreements are relevant to bad faith claims handling coverage disputes but will limit the information disclosed to those agreements and communications concerning the claim in dispute.

Texas Federal Court Allows Direct Action Against Reinsurer to Continue Under an Implied Agreement

Traditionally, a policyholder cannot sue a reinsurer without privity of contract or some exceptional circumstance. In a recent case, a Texas federal court denied a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by a policyholder against a reinsurer based on a finding that there was an implied agreement based on course of conduct.

In Indorama Ventures Holdings L.P. v. Factory Mutual Insurance Co., No. 1:24-cv-00404 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2025), the policyholder brought a breach of contract and declaratory judgment action to recover the full value of business interruption losses caused by an explosion. The policyholder had already recovered $50 million and was seeking an additional $50 million. The reinsurer moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action (no right to sue the reinsurer).

The facts indicate that the property and business interruption policy was issued by a captive insurer and reinsured by the reinsurer. But the reinsurer was the party who was obligated to adjust and pay any claims. In fact, the reinsurer adjusted and paid the first $50 million claim. The policy was originally issued to a third-party that the policyholder purchased, and the parties signed an insurance assignment agreement. That assignment agreement was agreed to by the reinsurer, which acknowledged its role in adjusting and paying claims directly to the policyholder.

Ultimately, the court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint. The court found that the reinsurance agreement was outside the complaint and did not need to be considered. But even if the reinsurance agreement was considered by the court, the complaint still stated a cause of action. Why, because of a Texas law.

The relevant law was Texas Insurance Code Ann. § 493.055, entitled “Limitation on the Rights Against Reinsurer,” which provides that:

A person does not have a right against a reinsurer that is not specifically stated in:
(1) the reinsurance contract; or
(2) a specific agreement between the reinsurer and the person.

As the court found, “[]he relevant ‘right’ in this case is [the policyholder’s] right to sue [the reinsurer] directly.” That right, held the court, did not exist under the reinsurance agreement.

First stop, § 493.055(1). The Reinsurance Agreement clearly forecloses [the policyholder’s] right to directly sue. A section entitled “B. Cooperation of the Company” cabins the rights created by the Reinsurance Agreement: “In no event shall anyone other than [the cedent] or, in the event of [the cedent’s] insolvency, its receiver, liquidator, or statutory successor, have any rights under this Agreement.” A separate section entitled “X. Exclusive Contract” similarly provides that “[i]n no event shall any party, other than [the cedent], or in the event of [the cedent’s] insolvency, its liquidator, have any rights against [the reinsurer] under this Reinsurance Agreement.”

But that was not the end of the inquiry. Under subsection (2) of the statute, if there is a “specific agreement” between the reinsurer and the policyholder, then a direct action is possible. Ultimately, the court determined that a specific agreement existed based on course of conduct. The court’s rationale was based on its view that the Texas Supreme Court would find that an “agreement” included an agreement based on course of conduct and that the facts pled, including certain adjustment communications attached to the motion, and the insurance assignment agreement, demonstrated course of conduct leading to an agreement between the reinsurer and the policyholder that the reinsurer would adjust and pay claims under the property policy.

In denying the motion to dismiss, the court held that the policyholder has sufficiently pled a right to sue the reinsurer directly based on an implied agreement outside the reinsurance agreement.

This could not have been a shock to the reinsurer given the insurance assignment agreement and its role in adjusting and paying the claims. But as the court stated, there are some factual issues and those will come out in summary judgment or trial if the case gets that far (which it might given the $50 million claim).

New York’s Highest Court Rules Direct Physical Loss or Damage Requires Material Alteration or Complete and Persistent Dispossession

The New York Court of Appeals (New York’s highest court for those expecting it to be the supreme court) has finally weighed in on the COVID-19 question of what direct physical loss or damage means in a property policy providing business interruption coverage. Not surprisingly, New York joins the vast majority of state and federal courts and affirmed the order below dismissing the complaint.

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Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Certifies COVID-19 Question to the California Supreme Court

While insurers have been successful in dismissing most COVID-19 property damage claims, especially in federal court, many of the coverage issues that arise in federal court actions are resolved based on state law. When a federal court finds that resolution of a dispute is governed by state law and that there is no controlling state law precedent, the court may certify the state law question to that state’s supreme court for resolution.

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Weapons Exclusion Precludes Coverage

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Courts are tough on exclusions but when an exclusion is clear it will preclude coverage. In a recent case, an exclusion for bodily injury arising out of weapons resulted in a coverage case being dismissed

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Brokers and Insurers Prevail in COVID-19 Coverage Action

There is no question that the COVID-19 restrictions imposed by local and state governments have had an unintentional but devastating effect on businesses both large, medium and especially small. Restaurants, movie theaters, live entertainment, sports. gyms, salons and many other businesses have closed because of the lack of business. While many of these businesses purchased insurance with coverages for business income and extra expense, the lack of direct physical loss of or damage to property has meant that these policies, for the most part, do not cover the loss of business caused by the government shut-down orders.

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When Claims-Made Primary and Occurrence Excess Policies Clash

Decades ago, professional liability policies, like most liability policies, were written on an occurrence basis. If a claim was incurred during the insurance policy period, the policy would respond to the claim regardless of when the claim was made against the defendant and noticed to the insurance company. As we know from environmental and asbestos claims, that can take decades.

Then along came claims-made polices. Under a typical claims-made policy, if a claim is made against the defendant and reported to the insurance company during the policy period, that insurance policy will respond to the claim regardless of when the occurrence took place (as long as the claim occurred after the policy’s retroactive date). If the claim was made after the policy period and , that policy would

In New York, legislative and regulatory efforts to keep medical professionals practicing in New York led to a quirky medical malpractice insurance system where most primary medical malpractice policies were claims-made policies, but New York medical professionals were provided with excess policies written on an occurrence basis.

This leads to a recent case that explored the issues that arise when occurrence-based excess policies sit on top of claims-made primary policies.

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Objectively Reasonable Expectations of the Insured Prevails – Improper Erosion Theory Rejected

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Primary and excess insurers periodically clash over whether the underlying claim should have been paid by the primary insurer. But it is pretty unusual for an excess insurer to argue that the underlying claim payment made by other insurers improperly eroded the excess insurer’s attachment point and prematurely triggered the excess coverage for a subsequent claim. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed the question of whether an excess insurer challenge an underlying insurer’s payment decision.

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When the Court Denies a Motion to Dismiss – COVID-19

As the COVID-19 business interruption cases are decided, many are keeping score. So far, the tally is in favor of the insurance industry, with a number of cases being dismissed for lack of direct physical loss of or damage to covered property by a covered peril.

Most of the cases filed seeking coverage have been met with motions to dismiss by the insurance company. As many of you know, a motion dismiss seeks to throw the case out of court because, on its face, the complaint does not state a cause or action. Basically, the court is saying that the allegations of the complaint, even if true, cannot as a matter of law, lead to coverage. Some courts allow the policyholder to file an amended complaint and some do not. It depends on the specific facts and allegations.

But not all courts have granted the insurance companies’ motions to dismiss. In a recent case, a Missouri federal court denied the motion. In this blog post I examine why.

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No Direct Physical Loss, No Coverage

COVID-19 business interruption claims have caused a groundswell of litigation, but courts continue to address business interruption claims in other contexts. The “direct physical loss” requirement remains at the heart of coverage disputes over whether business property policies are required to respond to claims.

Recently, the Eleventh Circuit addressed a business interruption coverage dispute that involved both an alleged downturn in revenue and expenses for cleaning up construction dust and debris.

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